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Major Problems With Article 2A:
Unfairness, "Cutting Off"
Consumer Defenses, Unfiled
Interests, and Uneven Adoption

by Donald B. King*

Article 2A on leases represents a major addition to the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). Proposed for adoption throughout the United
States, some states have already adopted the article. Because of the provision's impact, we must view it carefully and correct major flaws.
In the past, courts dealt with the field of leasing through analogy to
principles of sales law.' However, this treatment lead to the uneven application of the law, and a new codified law on leases is certainly desirable.
For their hard work and initiative, the drafters of Article 2A deserve
praise; however, they are not above criticism. The drafters must resolve
several major difficulties with the article before its adoption throughout
the United States. In those states that have already enacted it, some clarification and amendment may be in order.
This Article explores the major problems of Article 2A. Within each
area of criticism, some solutions, additions to the comments, amendments, or special legislation are suggested. This Article does not explain
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. Washington State University (B.S., 1954);
Harvard University (J.D., 1957); New York University (LL.M., 1963); Saint Louis University
(M.S.W., 1979). Member, Washington State, Missouri, and United States Supreme Court
Bar Associations; American Law Institute.
1. See, e.g., Hertz Com. Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 298
N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969), rev'd, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970); William D. Hawland, The Impact of
the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446 (1972); Daniel
E. Murray, Under the SpreadingAnalogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
FORDHAM L. REv. 447 (1971).
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or survey
various provisions of Article 2A, because others have already
2
done So.
I. UNFAIR LEASES

Caveat emptor or buyer beware: From the sixteenth century to the
twentieth and back again.
Many leases are standard form contracts. Indeed, an individually written or typed lease is rare, and sometimes even then printed form contracts are used. In situations involving consumers, the lease is almost always in standard form. The same is true for leases used by small
businessmen.
One problem with standard form contracts or leases is that they are
often one-sided.3 The party who drafted them almost always drafted
them heavily in its own favor. Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Reporter of the
U.C.C. and noted commercial law scholar, pointed out that lawyers drafting standard form contracts often made them extremely one-sided. Indeed, according to Llewellyn, these lawyers often took advantage of the
other party by securing every favorable term possible-even more terms
than the businessman client himself would want.'
The fine print, which consumers who are buying or leasing goods rarely
read, creates another problem with the standard form contract. Consumers can hardly be said to have a duty to read the fine print in many standard form contracts, considering how difficult it is to see. The print can
be so fine that it requires a magnifying glass. Often the print is light and
blends into an endless sea of words. Even if those clauses were read,
many consumers and small businessmen would find it difficult to understand the "legalese" or the hidden legal impact of such clauses.
In standard form contracts or leases, no real negotiation about the
printed clauses takes place. One party simply presents the other with a
standard form. The other party must either buy or lease the goods under
the contract terms or forego the transaction. He probably cannot get better terms elsewhere, because all standard form contracts usually contain
2. Amelia H. Boss, The Legislative History of Article 2A Revisited, 1 COM. L. ANN. 205
(1991); see also Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitionerand
Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REv. 575 (1988); Peter A. Alces, Surreptitiousand Not-So-Surreptitious Adjustment of the UCC: An Introductory Essay, 39 ALA. L. RFv. 559 (1988); Edwin
E. Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 615
(1988).
3. See Donald B. King, Standard Form Contracts: A New Perspective, 1 CoM. L. ANN.
137 (1991) [hereinafter "King"].
4. Karl Llewellyn, 1 N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. 177-78 (1954).
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similar terms favoring the stronger party. Thus, no real negotiation or
choice exists in these contract or lease situations.
Unconscionability is one major attack on the unfair contract. 5 Under
Article 2 of the U.C.C., unconscionability has become a major weapon in
the hands of consumers and small businessmen. In a number of cases, the
courts recognized the realities involved in standard form contracting.6 For
example, regarding the monopolistic use of one-sided clauses, the court in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.7 pointed out what little choice the
consumer has since most companies have these clauses in their standard
form contracts.$ One-sided clauses are also found in leasing. In this regard, no significant difference between contracts and leases exists.
Further, while Henningsen dealt with a 'contract for the sale of a car,
more and more buyers are leasing cars. Many companies and financial
institutions encourage leases as a way of saving money and gaining tax
advantages. Those engaged in financing sometimes advocate leasing in
their literature. Since the drafting of the U.C.C., leasing "has grown explosively and now represents a sizeable sector of our economy."'
Some ,courts have analyzed the one-sidedness of standard form leases.
The courts point out both the unfairness of particular clauses and their
cumulative effect. In Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron,
Inc.,1" the court pointed out that even a "minor and insignificant breach
of the lease" would, if the written lease terms were enforced, "permit[]

5. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990); see also Donald B. King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Ethics, Title, and Good Faith Purchase, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 15 (1966);
William B. Davenport, Unconscionabilityand the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 121 (1967); Alphanse M. Squillante, Commercial Code Review: Summary of Leading
Decisions and Articles, 73 CoM. L.J. 167, 224 (1968); M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YAE L.J. 757 (1969); David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages In Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 328 (1969); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Irvin Younger, A Judge's View of
Unconscionability, 5 UCC L.J. 348 (1973); Richard W. Duesenberg, Practitioner's View of'
Contract Unconscionability,8 UCC L.J. 237 (1976); Jonathan A. Eddy, On the "Essential"
Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC § 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REv. 28
(1977); Donald B.King, The Tort of Unconscionability:A New Tort for New Times, 23 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 97 (1979) [hereinafter "King, The Tort of Unconscionability"];John Honnold,
The New Uniform Law for InternationalSales and the UCC: A Comparison, 18 INT'L LAW.
21 (1984); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Destruction of ContractDoctrine,94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J.
1065 (1986); M.N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1988); Kerry L. Macintosh, When are
Merger Clauses Unconscionable?,64 DEN, U.L. REV. 529 (1988).
6. See U.C.C. Case Digest § 2-302.
7. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
8. Id. at 87.
9. Boss, supra note 2, 39 ALA. L. REV. at 576.
10. 427 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1980).
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. to recover damages far in excess of the fair value of such

a minor (or even moderate) breach.""
The court in Henningsen also pointed out that in reality consumers are
never shown the particular fine print clauses in the contracts. 2 Usually,
the seller does not specifically call the one-sided disclaimer clause to the
attention of the buyer.' 3 Further, most persons do not understand fully
the legal consequences of the term."
The drafters of Article 2A recognized the doctrine of unconscionability
and provided for it in section 2A-108. If the court finds a "lease contract
or any clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made," the court may enforce the lease without the unconscionable
clause or limit the clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.'8 Indeed, paragraph 1 sets forth this basic principle and "is taken almost verbatim from the provisions of Section 2-302(1)," which regulates sales contracts.' As the drafters further noted, the basic purpose of this section is
to apply the concept of unconscionability to leases."
The Article 2A section on unconscionability goes beyond Article 2 and
recognizes that unconscionable means may have induced the consumer to
enter into a lease. 8 In this sense, the article recognizes not only the "illness of unconscionability," reflected in the contract, but some of its
causes as well. The provision realistically perceives that a lease, appearing
on its face to be valid, may have-been induced by unconscionable conduct
and, therefore, should not be enforced. Under such circumstances, the injustice of enforcement is self-evident. Unconscionable conduct, in the collection of any claim arising from the lease contract, is barred." This part
of the Article 2A section is based on the Uniform Consumer Credit Act, 0
which also recognizes that unconscionable conduct should not be rewarded.21 Indeed, unconscionable conduct in the formation of the lease or
its enforcement could be recognized as a tort that would give way to punitive damages in appropriate circumstances."
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Part).
21.
22.

Id. at 878.
161 A.2d at 92.
Id.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2A-108(i) (1990).
Id. § 2A-108 cmt.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 2A-108(2).
Uniform Consumer Credit Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1974 & 1991 Cumulative Annual Pocket
U.C.C. § 2A-108 cmt. (1990).
Id. § 2A-108(3); see also King, The Tort of Unconscionability,supra note 5.
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In paragraph 3 of the section on unconscionability, the drafters seem to
encourage an attack on unfair and unconscionable lease terms by providing that if one prevails on the unconscionability claim, he or she shall also
prevail as to attorney fees.2 3 Without this provision, many attorneys
might never take an unconscionability case because the amounts involved
are often not great enough to justify participation on their part. By assuring attorney fees, paragraph 3 makes it practical for lawyers to attack the
unfair contract or lease clauses.
Unfortunately, paragraph 4(b) of the same section destroys the possibility of attacks on unfair clauses by placing the risk of huge attorney fees
for the other side on the consumer. 24 This paragraph deals the "death
blow" to unconscionability claims. Indeed, it makes the other three sections virtually meaningless. While paragraph 4(b) may seem logical to
some on the surface, its impact is disastrous.
Paragraph 4(b) provides that if a judge deems any unconscionability
claim to be groundless, then attorney fees may be assessed against tie
party raising it.2 5 "Groundless" is so nebulous and uncertain that it
makes it risky for consumers to assert unconscionability. The term is not
defined in either the text or comments, and what is "groundless" to one
person may not seem so to another. For example, one might view the
lease clause as harsh, one-sided, and unconscionable, while another might
justify it on the basis of the lessor's need to discipline lessees or to avert
any possible risks; one might view the unread and hidden standard form
lease clause as "unfair surprise," while another might say consumers have
a duty to read the entire contract.
If an attorney asserts a new theory of unconscionability, a judge unfortunately might find it to be groundless.. As pointed out in the American
Law Institute ("A.L.I.") discussion, would the judges have held the assertion by Brandeis and Warren of the right of privacy as a new theory
groundless? 2 Some judges might have! Yet this theory eventually became
a major part of the law.
The doctrine of unconscionability has only been used in the last several
decades and may still undergo considerable development. In this regard, a
number of theories are likely to be asserted and accepted by the courts in
the coming years. Also, unconscionability could be recognized in an increasing number of situations. Nevertheless, in this period of uncertainty
and development, some courts will hesitate to find unconscionability.
Many judges may be conservative and see the unconscionability claim as
23.
24.
25.
26.
PRoc.

U.C.C. § 2A-108(4) (1990).
Id. § 2A-108(4)(b).
Id.
Donald B. King, Discussion of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2A, 64 ALJ,
452 (1987) [hereinafter "Donald B. King"].
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"groundless." In a fair number of unknown cases, paragraph 4 will indeed
be evoked against the party raising unconscionability with a most serious
impact.
On the floor of the A.L.I., this writer pointed out:
What consumer will risk his car, his house, his entire financial savings to
bring an action based on unconscionability when, indeed, he may be held
liable under this Section?
It makes no difference that his claim may have some grounds. He runs
the risk of losing his home, his auto, his savings, and having to pay for
the expenses of the attorney of the other side. No consumer will bring an
action under this Section; rather, he will hesitate to ever develop further
grounds of unconscionability. It is a virtual death knell. When I first read
this Section I thought it applied primarily to businesses. However, it is
clear that it is directed against the consumer by the Comments that refer
to groundless consumer actions. It seems to be that this Section, if it is to
the consumer from this tremendous obstacle that
be kept, must exempt
27
he would encounter.

Acknowledging that this position might be meritorious, the Reporter,
Mr. DeKoven, assured members of the A.L.I. that serious thought would
be given to the matter, and that it would be reconsidered:
MR. DEKOVEN: Professor King, I had the opportunity to think about
the point that you raised because you were kind enough to send me your
comment, not only in advance, but typewritten so that I could read it
and understand it. And I have to say that in the process of developing
the draft, no one ever raised the issue, at least not that I am aware, or
ever discussed it with me. I think that you present a compelling argument, and what I intend to do is to discuss the issue further with our
Advisers on the subject, hoping that we can respond in a meaningful way
to your excellent point, and I thank you."
Under these circumstances, the drafters of Article 2A must acknowledge
that they did not have the approval of the A.L.I. to include paragraph
4(b). Had a vote been taken on the matter at that time, the A.L.I. probably would have rejected that paragraph. This highly unusual procedure,
however, allowed the provision to remain in the draft. No serious reconsideration of this matter regarding either changes or additions to the text
or to the comments appears to have been made.
Attorneys in private practice and legal aid will readily attest that this
type of provision, permitting the seller's attorney fees to be assessed
against the consumer, will have a tremendous deterrent effect on attacking unfair leases. Certainly, every attorney must inform his client of the
27. ld.
28. Id. at 452-53.
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potential risk of having to pay attorney fees for the other side. Once an
attorney highlights this particular risk, most clients will not want to raise
the issue or continue with it. The client must be informed not just generally, but specifically, that he could lose his car, his belongings, and even
his home to pay attorney fees for the other side. Even if the attorney tells
the client that the risk is slight (perhaps only one in twenty, or one in
fifty, or even one in one hundred), what client would risk this much simply to attack an unfair lease? Once informed, the client may feel it is
better to keep his belongings and simply let the lease involving several
hundred dollars go.
In truth, the attorney must also tell his client that he cannot guarantee
a judge will not invoke this clause. The attorney must acknowledge that
because some judges are conservative and arbitrary, the result is uncertain. The consumer's risk is magnified by the fact that some judges will
make erroneous decisions. As this writer noted on the floor of the A.L.I.:
I once said that the cases decided under the U.C.C. were decided about
one third wrong, about one third right for the wrong reasons, and about
one third right for the right reasons. I'm afraid the same thing may be
true here. There is that chance of the one-third wrong decision that
would go against the consumer. No consumer can afford this death knell
or the cost of appealing the litigation."
What is the solution to this very serious problem that impels raising unconscionability against unfair contracts? Several possibilities exist
through both case law and legislation.
Under one solution, judges can find that this provision deprives persons
from asserting their legal rights in court, thus depriving them of their
constitutional rights to due process. Yet, some courts will simply say it
deprives the individual only of raising frivolous claims. These courts ignore the impact of this clause on preventing legitimate claims. However,
many courts will deal only with the logic of the wording per se and not
with its true impact.
A second case law approach may be more successful. The attorney attacking the unfair contract or unfair lease clause need not raise unconscionability. Rather, he can assert that no real consent to the unfair standard form contract or lease clause exists and that, therefore, it is
ineffective. The attorney can assert that the parties did not agree on that
particular matter and, hence, the clause is not valid. The contract or lease
includes only those terms that were actually discussed and agreed upon.
Legal authorities who recognize the realities of standard form contracts
support this theory. 0 Even Karl Llewellyn recognized that many clauses
29. Id. at 452.
30. See King, supra note 3, at 140, 152, 158-59.
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exist to which no assent is ever reached.31 The court should not allow one
party to impose such terms upon the other without consent. In recent
the
times, several commentators have pointed this out, some arguing that
32
court must find some reasonableness before enforcing the clause.
In a recent article, this writer asserted that the courts should not enforce "unagreed upon" terms in standard forms."3 Other legal authorities
and courts may continue this line of reasoning, freeing the law of the tyranny of the standard form contract. Until recently, those drafting standard form contracts had the support of courts who used artificial and
unrealistic rationale. 3 4 A misunderstanding of what the law should be
arose. Under this writer's theory, the court should enforce only those
clauses agreed upon. Using this theory, the plaintiff can avoid the danger
of paragraph 4 of Article 2A. Moreover, it could not ever be said that to
raise the point that one should not be held to a clause that one has not
actually agreed upon is "groundless."
However, this provision of Article 2A should be amended before it is
enacted in any other state. The proposed amendment would simply delete paragraph 4(b) of this section dealing with unconscionability. Thus,
the death blow to unconscionability actions or defenses would never occur
in that jurisdiction. Indeed, Oregon and Florida have already enacted Article 2A without paragraph 4." However, the best solution for other states
would be to enact it without the offensive part, paragraph 4(b).
For the states that have already enacted Article 2A, the solution is almost as simple. In those states, an amendment to Article 2A repealing
paragraph 4(b) is required. Again, once it is deleted the "death blow" to
unconscionability would no longer exist.
One other solution would be simply to leave Article 2A as is, but to
enact a statute for consumer protection that would override paragraph 4,
for example:
CONSUMER PROTECTION AGAINST OPPOSITION ATTORNEY FEES

In regard to claims of unconscionability, no attorney fees will be allowed against any consumer raising any claim of unconscionability or
making any attack on unfair contracts.
In this form, this statute would protect consumers, but it may not protect small businessmen. However, the statute could be modified to read
"party" instead of "consumer," or a separate statute could be passed to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
1990));

KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
See King, supra note 3, at 155.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 141-51.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN, Note § 8 (appearing between Chap. 72 and Chap. 73) (Supp.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 680.1081 (West Supp. 1992).
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protect small businessmen as well. The more simple solution is, however,
to amend Article 2A by deleting paragraph 4(b).
In addition, the Commissioners should amend their proposal of Article
2A-108 by deleting paragraph 4(b). They have that power and do make
amendments through their joint Permanent Editorial Board. If they are
unwilling to make such an amendment, they should at least add further
explanation to the comments to U.C.C. section 2A-108:
ADDITION TO COMMENTS

Paragraph 4(b) should not be used to discourage the bringing of unconscionability claims in good faith, and such claims may be brought
even though the theory on which they are raised is novel. Further rejection by some courts of similar claims in the past should in no way prevent asserting the issue for reconsideration and change. To minimize any
assessment of costs against the party raising the unconscionability issue,
an assertion that an opponent's claim of unconscionability is in bad faith
and groundless must be made immediately, and a hearing held on that
issue without delay.
II. CUTTING OFF CONSUMER DEFENSES
From the 1600s through most of the 1900s, when consumer defenses
were "cut-off" by legal doctrines, to the consumer protection in the
1970s and 1980s barring this result, and back again.

\

Difficulty rests in the uncertainty Article 2A creates with respect to
whether consumer defenses against the goods will be preserved against
the financier of the transaction. An amendment is desirable to make this
clear.
A short excursion into commercial and consumer law history is useful
to understand this point. In the 1600s, the commercial law "holder in due
course" doctrine was being assimilated into the common law." The basic
doctrine became entrenched despite various debates on whether a subjective or objective standard of good faith was required of the holder in due
course of commercial paper signed by the buyer of the goods. 3 7 Under the
doctrine, the holder in due course could "cut off" any defenses of the
buyer related to such matters as the quality of the goods or representations made about them. Normally, when only a seller and buyer were involved and payments were made over a period of time, if the goods were
defective, the buyer could raise this as a defense and cease making pay36. DONALD B. KING ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. 511 (1987)
[hereinafter KING, KUENZEL & STONE).
37. For a textual discussion and case citations see Note, Donald B. King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 DICK. L. REv. 207, 209
n.11 (1961).
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ments. However, if the seller had sold the promissory note signed by the
buyer to a bank or financing institution, then the bank, as a "holder in
due course," could force the buyer to continue making monthly payments
without regard to the defense that the goods were defective. The U.C.C.
adopted and retained this doctrine.38 The buyer's "personal defenses"
were "cut off" by holders in due course."
Not long after the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the U.C.C. in the
1950s, serious consumer problems became apparent. Some courts allowed
consumer defenses to be cut off, while others found some "fraud in facturn" or "real fraud" in the consumer's signing of the promissory notes
that allowed the consumer some protection. 0 Even in the early 1960s,
this writer advocated amendments to the U.C.C. for legislation to protect
the consumer."
In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of states enacted statutes designed to
prevent the "holder in due course" doctrine from applying to consumer4
sales. 42 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") drafted a similar rule.

3

Federal law also preserved the consumer's right to raise defenses and
cease making any payments on credit card purchases.4 The drafters of
Article 2A attempted to make clear that consumer protection laws, current and future, are not affected by enactment of Article 2A.45
Consumer protection in the finance lease situation requires clarification. Article 2A provides that the finance lessor shall not be responsible
for implied warranties on the goods.4' The comments point out that "the
lessee looks almost entirely to the supplier for representations, covenants
and warranties.

47

The finance lessor "remain[s] outside the selection,

manufacture and supply of the goods."' "4This is "the rationale for releasing the lessor from most of its traditional liability."'
One may understand why the drafters did not want to place positive
liability for damages due to loss or injury from defective goods on the
finance lessor; however, whether the financier remains subject to the
38.

See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990).

39. Id. § 3-305.
40. For a discussion of these cases, see King, supra note 37, at 211-13.
41. Id. at 213-15.
.42. See William F. Greerhalgh, The FTC's Holder-In-Due Course-Rule: An Ineffective
Means of Achieving Optimality in the Consumer Credit Market, 25 UCLA L. REv. 821, 82324 (1978).
43. 16 C.F.R. § 443.2 (1991).

44. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 170, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988).
45.
46.
47.

U.C.C. § 2A-104(1)(c) cmt. 2 (1990).
Id. § 2A-212.
Id, § 2A-103 cmt. (g).

48.
49.

Id.
Id.
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buyer's defense that the go ds are defective with regard to making payments is unclear. Can th 'buyer cease to make payments on the basis that
the goods are defective? If the consumer must still make payments, then
his or her defenses have been cut off just as effectively as they were under
the old "holder in due course" doctrine. Under the former circumstances,
the financier of the transaction purchases commercial paper, while in the
lease situation, the financier holds a different piece of paper, a lease, over
the head of the consumer. If adequate consumer protection is to exist, the
results should be the same.
This writer may be viewing this matter too technically. However, one
can argue that most of the consumer protection statutes that abolish the
cut off of defenses against holders in due course do not apply to the finance lease setting. Indeed, the legislatures drafted the statutes in a different context; making it difficult to read the finance lease setting into
them. Further, the drafters of Article 2A decided as a matter of policy not
to include consumer protection within its provisions. 0 Indeed, the drafters considered provisions that would invalidate contractual clauses in
consumer leases, but decided instead to leave this task to state law." It
would be ironic if after all these years of struggle, protection could be
subverted by a finance lease arrangement.
Of course, the drafters may have made it clear that consumer protection is to be preserved. 2 In setting forth this policy, the drafters would
not have intended to cut off consumer defenses regarding goods. Further,
while providing that the financier shall not be responsible for warranties," the drafters did not say that a defense to payment by the buyer
was barred against the finance lessor. Failure to make that statement supports the overall policy of preserving existing consumer protection.
Since the supplier's express and implied warranties extend to the consumer under section 2A-209," some argue that he or she should be able to
withhold payments for breach of warranty. Withholding further payments
against the supplier or ordinary lessor could be an integral part of the
buyer's rights. The buyer's rights against the supplier should include the
right to withhold payment, and this right should remain even in a finance
lease.
Why leave the matter to even the slightest doubt or to the courts' interpretation? An amendment is in order, and it might read:
50. Fred H. Miller, Consumer Leases Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2A, 39
L. REv. 957, 961-62 (1988).
51. Id. at 970.
52. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53. See generally U.C.C. § 2A (1990).
54. Id. § 2A-209(1) & cmt. 1.

ALA.
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CONSUMER DEFENSES PRESERVED

No consumer shall be barred from raising any defense he or she has
based on the quality or performance of the goods or, based on the signing
of legal documents against the finance lessor or any other party.
If a state has already adopted Article 2A or wants to cover this matter
separately, it can pass a special consumer protection statute:
CONSUMER PROTECTION AGAINST DEPRIVING CONSUMERS OF THEIR
DEFENSES By FINANCE LEASING

No consumer shall be barred from raising against a finance lessor any
defense to payment he or she might have concerning the goods or signing
of legal documents. All rights preserved against holders in due course of
commercial paper or contracts shall be applicable likewise to finance
lessors.
The federal government could also enact a similar statute.
III.

UNFILED "HIDDEN" INTERESTS

From the secret lien of the eighteenth century to court hostility and
legislative filing requirements of the twentieth century and back again.
Article 2A does not require the lessor to file a lease to advise buyer's
creditors of the lessor's interest in the goods. Hence, creditors may be
misled by an unfiled or secret lease. Under the U.C.C., a "lease" must be
filed if it is a security interest rather than a true lease.55 Considerable
litigation has resulted from this provision. Adopting various tests, courts
have found leases not to truly be leases. For example, the Supreme Court
of Alaska" moved from a multifactor to a single factor test even though
different tests are used in other states.5 7 Since then, the U.C.C. definition
of security interest has been amended, and it is quite likely that considerable litigation will center around this new amendment.56
One solution to this problem would be to require the filing of leases and
security interests. Thus, whether it be a security or lease interest, a creditor could ascertain whether any "hidden interest" was present in the
goods on which he was loaning credit. The U.C.C. could easily require the
filing of leases and security interests.5 Indeed, Article 9 of the U.C.C.
55. Id. § 1-201(37) (1987).
56. See Western Enters. v. Arctic Office Machs., 667 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1983).
57. Id. at 1235-36.
58. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987).
59. For others who advocate such filing, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175,
190-94 (1983); Peter Coogan & Amelia H. Boss, Uniform Commercial Code Treatment for
All Leases, in 1 COOGAN ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC 1047 (1968); see
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offers parties the option of filing leases.10 The Article 9 filing system is
clearly designed to handle such filings, 'and in one province of Canada,
legislation requires the filing of leases. Apparently, this requirement has
had no adverse effects." Indeed, creditors in this province are much better informed with respect to any secret lease interests involved.
An amendment to Article 2A or to Article 9 requiring the filing of
leases could readily effectuate this solution. Also, a separate piece of legislation could require the filing of leases within the existing code filing systems. A federal filing system for both lease interests and security interests
may be developed someday.
The drafters of Article 2A did not think filing of leases was necessary
for two reasons.6 2 First, the leasing industry is opposedto it;6 3 this reason
is not sufficient when other parties may be hurt by the lack of filing. Second, the reporter viewed the current state filing systems as "very heavily
overloaded."64 The simple solution to this problem is to make those systems more efficient. With the use of computers, this should be no problem. Further, most states have not asserted or presented evidence of such
overloading.
While the drafters of Article 2A did not envision a filing requirement
for leases, the article does not prohibit it. As mentioned, an amendment
to Article 2A or Article 9 could achieve this result. Since existing filing
systems established by Article 9 could be used for leases, no problem of
implementation exists.
IV.

UNEVEN ADOPTION

From a group of colonies and then states with their own commercial
laws in the eighteenth century to a national trade and economy in the
twentieth century and back again.
Article 2A is being proposed on a state by state basis. During the article's enactment, some states will choose Article 2A or modifications of it.
Some states will not choose it at all. As a result, the law of leases will vary
from state to state. Why should the rights of a lessor or lessee vary so
also Ron C. Cumming, Canadian Developments in Personal Property Law, in COOGAN ET
AL. For a discussion advocating further study of this matter, see Charles W, Mooney, The
Mystery and Myth of 'Obstensible Ownership' and Article 9 Ftling: A Critique of Proposals
to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing,86 COLuM. L. Ry.v 901 (1986).
60. U.C.C. § 9-408 (1972).
61. See Cumming, supra note 59.
62. U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1990).
63. A.L.I. Proc. 458 (1987). Donald B. King, supra note 26, at 458.
64. Id.
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heavily based on state boundaries? Why should living on one side of a
mountain range or river, which historically determined the state's boundaries, make a difference as to the rights of individuals engaged in trade
across them? The commerce of today is part of a national trade network
and economy. Ironically, Article 2A is being pursued at the state level
rather than at the national level. This approach is, however, consistent
with that generally taken with regard to the U.C.C.
The drafters, the A.L.I., and Uniform Laws Commissioners, should
have learned the lessons of the past with regard to the adoption techniques. The U.C.C. was drafted between 1940 and 1949. Pennsylvania
adopted it in 1952. Other states adopted it in the late 1950s and the early
and mid-1960s. Thus, the U.C.C. was not enacted throughout the nation
until twenty-five years after drafting began.6 During this period of adoption, commercial law was not uniform throughout the land. Sellers and
buyers in one state had different rights than those in others. States used
different legal tests and concepts to ascertain what those rights were. The
implementation process ignored the fact that manufacturers in one state
often sold their goods in another state. Indeed, these goods were often
sold from one manufacturer to others who sold to still others in various
states. Consumers should have certain basic rights regardless of where
they happen to live.
In the years between the U.C.C.'s formulation and enactment, society
changed markedly. New business practices developed, and credit cards
became commonplace. The U.C.C. did not cover these changes. New
methods of banking and electronic transfers also came into being and
were not covered by the U.C.C. In addition, major social changes, such as
the consumer protection movement of the 1960s, brought forward new
demands for laws not embodied within the U.C.C. Strict liability in tort
for defective products illustrates how case law sometimes moved the law
ahead of the U.C.C. ss The lessons are clear: state by state enactment
takes time, creates nonuniformity, and makes the law a less effective instrument for dealing with constantly occurring changes. Despite the lessons of the past, the A.L.I. and the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws continue state by state adoption for such matters as Article 2A on
leasing and amendments to the U.C.C.

7

As one very obvious solution to this problem, the U.C.C. could be enacted on the federal level so that national law could deal with commercial
matters including leasing. Indeed, by trying to promote a uniform law on
a state by state basis, the A.L.I. and the Commissioners indirectly ac65.

See KING, KUENZEL & STONE, supra note 36, at 4, 5 (1987).

66.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

402A (1965).

67. Amendments to Articles 3 and 4 are also proposed by the A.L.I. for state by state
adoption, despite proposals on the floor for consideration of possible federal enactment.

19921

PROBLEMS IN 2A

knowledge this fact. State by state enactment reaches the same goal as
federal enactment. The A.L.I. should have no problem formulating an appropriate plan since it can propose legislation on either a state or federal
level. The Commissioners should find it implied in their powers to promote the best commercial law for each state, whether through federal or
state action. Clearly, uniformity is desirable and practical; federal enactment promotes uniformity in state law. The state can act voluntarily by
appointing commissions, drafting acts, and entrusting those acts to federal enactment.
The law of leasing or other commercial laws should not be decided on a
state by state basis. Those laws do not inherently reflect a strong state
interest or command state enactment. Indeed, laws that regulate the flow
of goods and commercial transactions over state lines should be considered national in character. The states have little interest in the massive
number of goods flowing over their boundaries or even those that are part
of a national economy. Because some states might feel the need -for
greater consumer protection than others, those states can enact special
legislation to provide such protection. In any event, the basic national
framework of the commercial law should be the same.
The federal government clearly has the power to enact a federal law on
commercial matters including leasing through the interstate commerce
clause.68 That clause covers both transactions that involve crossing state
boundaries and those that have an indirect economic impact. Under relevant case law, localized activity, although only remotely and indirectly
affecting interstate commerce, is enough to allow federal enactment.
The case involving a farmer who raised extra wheat locally for his own
local use is a good illustration of the broad federal constitutional power."
Similarly, the federal government regulated a family owned restaurant,
Ollie's Barbecue, although it served food only to local customers.'"
Though not enacted for commercial purposes, the civil rights statute is
constitutional since it falls within the purview of the interstate commerce
clause.7" Undoubtedly, laws on commercial activity such as leasing fall
within the interstate commerce clause power; its inclusion is constitutionally justified more easily than in the examples above. Commercial activity
is national in character. More importantly, federal power was designed to
promote federal regulation of commercial activity. Federal and state
courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction over issues of federal law, by
implication of Article III of the United States Constitution, unless Con68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
69. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
70. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
71. 379 U.S. at 248.
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gress expressly states otherwise. Also by congressional act, federal court
jurisdiction over U.C.C. issues could be negated, leaving it solely to the
state courts if so desired.
V.

CONCLUSION

Article 2A on leasing can provide greater justice and less uncertainty if
a few simple amendments are made to the text and comments. Without
these important changes, the law will regress to earlier fundamental
problems.
Certainly everyone would agree that fairness in leases is a desirable
goal. To achieve this goal, the section dealing with unconscionability will
be most useful."2 However, that section should be amended by deleting
paragraph 4(b), which makes possible the assessment of opposition attorney fees against the consumer. This formidable risk will deter many consumers from legitimately asserting unconscionability. In the meantime,
courts may attack unfair leases by' asserting that terms never actually
agreed upon are not part of the lease contract.
With regard to the underlying transaction or the goods, consumer defenses should be preserved. A finance lessor holding the lease paper
should be subject to the lessee withholding his payments until such a defense is resolved. The consumer's hard fight for rights that limit holders
in due course of commercial paper should be applicable to holders of
"lease paper" as well. The text or comments to Article 2A should make
this point clear.
To solve these significant problems, a simple amendment to protect
consumers could be made. It could read:
Uniform Consumer Protection Amendments
1. Paragraph 4(b) of Section 2A-108 on unconscionability is repealed. No

opposition attorney fees may be assessed against consumers.
2. No consumer shall be barred from raising against a finance lessor any
defense he has against any other party based on the goods or performance or signing of legal documents. All consumer rights preserved against
holders in due course shall be equally preserved against finance lessors.
These amendments would preserve consumer victories won over many
years. Failure to make such amendments may result in not only a reversal
of those consumer victories won in battles over the years, but a rout and
slaughter of consumers' rights.
With regard to the filing of leases, states should be aware that if they so
desire, they may require it. Otherwise lease interests may be hidden from
other creditors. Unfiled lease interests could become as detrimental as
72.

U.C.C. § 2A-108 (1990).
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unfiled security interests were to creditors before the enactment of Article
9 of the U.C.C.
Finally, everyone agrees that commercial. law-including leasing-should be uniform. Sentimentality for states rights where no major
state interest for localized law exists has compelled the painfully slow
process of state by state enactment of the same law. A much more uniform and expeditious method would be to enact Article 2A on leasing, as
well as other commercial law, on a federal basis. This would accomplish
the same goal that the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws seek. Both those groups and their supporters need to reconsider their functions and the methods of law reform to be used with
regard to commercial and consumer law.

